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I. INTRODUCTION
What is the relation between socioeconomic rights and theories of 
justice?  By socioeconomic rights, I mean rights of the kind we see listed
in Articles 23–26 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR),1 in Articles 9–13 of the International Covenant on Economic, 
* University Professor and Professor of Law, New York University, and
Chichele Professor of Social and Political Theory, Oxford.  I am grateful to Ronald 
Dworkin, John Ferejohn, Bernard Grofman, Jeff Howard, Janos Kis, Liora Lazarus, 
Franch Michelman, Dan McDermott, David Miller, Thomas Nagel, Pasquale Pasquino, 
Thomas Pogge, and Henry Shue for comments on an earlier draft of this Article. 
Portions of pages 784–87 are reprinted with the permission of the Cambridge University
Press.
1. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/217(III), at 75–76 (Dec. 10, 1948) (declaring, for example, rights to education, to 
an adequate standard of living, and to protection against unemployment). 
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Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR),2 and in national instruments such
as Articles 26–29 of the South African Constitution’s Bill of Rights.3 
Now the articles just mentioned are legal or quasi-legal provisions.
I really want to ask about the principles they embody or seek to embody.
What is the relation between something like the principle that everyone
has a right to social assistance if they are unable to support themselves 
and the principles typically comprised in a theory of justice?
By a theory of justice, I mean something that does the sort of thing 
that John Rawls did in his book A Theory of Justice4: set out and defend 
some very general principles governing the basic structure of society in
regard to their impact on the life prospects of and the enjoyment of
primary goods by individuals.  I do not by any means regard Rawls’s
work as canonical.  Later in the Article, I shall refer to two alternative 
theories, at least one of them quite stridently opposed to Rawls’s.  But
Rawls’s work affords a fine example of the sort of thing I mean by a 
theory of justice, and it makes clear the difficulty of the question I want 
to ask.  Rawls’s theory is certainly not hostile to the idea of welfare 
provision, but principles of the kind alluded to in the previous paragraph 
do not feature among Rawls’s principles of justice as fairness—among
the two complex principles that constitute his conception of justice.5 
Why is this?  The most plausible explanation is that socioeconomic rights, 
or principles embodying socioeconomic rights, are usually formulated at 
the wrong level of generality or abstraction to be included among the 
most fundamental principles of a theory such as Rawls’s.  But then we 
should ask, What is the relationship between abstract principles of 
justice and these somewhat less abstract principles requiring welfare 
provision? 
For the purpose of answering this question, Rawls’s theory has the 
advantage of being quite complicated in the set of abstract principles that
it yields, in its internal structure, and in the system of argumentation
associated with it.  His theory is built up on the basis of certain—by now
familiar—model-theoretic ideas, such as the original position6 and the 
veil of ignorance.7  It comprises a number of meta-ethical conceptions
about reflective equilibrium and the relation of a philosophical construction
 2. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 
2200 (XXI) A, Annex, U.N. Doc. A/6316, at 50–51 (Dec. 16, 1966) (declaring, for 
example, rights to social security, to special protections for mothers and children, and to 
freedom from hunger). 
 3. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, arts. 26–29 (declaring, for example, rights of access to 
adequate housing and health care services). 
4. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 52–78 (rev. ed. 1999). 
5. Id. at 52–56. 
6. Id. at 181. 
7. Id. at 130–60. 
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to commonsense precepts and our considered judgments about justice.8 
It includes an account of the relation between justice and the theory of 
the person. In the elaboration of the theory’s practical implications, 
there is the “four-stage sequence,” there are theories of institutional 
competence and institutional responsibility, there is an argument about
the pure procedural characteristics of what Rawls calls the basic structure,
and there is a complex account of the relation between the two principles 
of justice as fairness and certain detailed theorems in public policy.9  All 
of this makes Rawls’s theory a good paradigm for our purposes.  As I
said, this is not because it is the last word on justice.  Rather, it is because
the theory offers numerous possible points of access for argument about 
socioeconomic rights, making it interesting to consider where in this 
complex structure such arguments are most appropriately located. 
I think this consideration can be very helpful in political philosophy. 
Here is one way it can help: Some well-known theories of justice give 
the impression of being hostile to socioeconomic rights.  Robert Nozick’s
theory of historical entitlement in Anarchy, State, and Utopia is a good 
example.10  If we want to figure out what to think about this hostility— 
whether it is justified or whether it can be answered—we also have to 
ask, What is the proper relation between socioeconomic rights and a 
theory of justice?  Only then can we assess whether a convincing case 
has been made by the theorist in question for denying that there is any
justification for socioeconomic rights. 
You might think that it is unnecessary to confront questions like these
or that confronting them is a purely academic exercise.  If we are
independently convinced that a case can be made for principles like 
those embodied in UDHR Article 23(1)11 or ICESCR Article 11(1),12 
why should we care how that relates to a highly abstract theory like John 
Rawls’s or to a conception of justice founded on principles known to be 
8. See infra Part II. 
9. See infra Part VIII. 
10. See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 238 (1974); Jeremy
Waldron, Nozick and Locke: Filling the Space of Rights, 22 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 81, 110
(2005). 
11. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, supra note 1, at 75 (“[T]he right to work, to free choice 
of employment, to just and favourable conditions of work and to protection against 
unemployment.”). 
12. G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI) A, supra note 2, at 50 (“[T]he right of everyone to an
adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing
and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions.”). 
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hostile to socioeconomic rights like that of Robert Nozick’s?  Moral 
philosophers may be preoccupied with the delicacies of Nozick’s or
Rawls’s model-theoretic conceptions.  But these conceptions are so
remote in their abstraction from the compelling matters that proponents 
of socioeconomic rights have to address—life and death, sickness and 
health, poverty and human flourishing—that they are best left to languish in
their ivory towers where they will not distract us from the more urgent
concerns of human well-being.
I think saying that would be a mistake. The structural relation between
socioeconomic rights and theories of justice is certainly a fascinating 
intellectual conundrum.  But it is of more than academic interest.  The 
claim that there are socioeconomic rights, that they really are human
rights, that they deserve to be taken as seriously as, say, civil and political
rights, and that the failure to fulfill them is in the same normative 
category as rights violations like torture, censorship, disenfranchisement,
or detention without trial is controversial even on its own ground. 
Politically it is attacked by those who claim priority for property rights 
and market structures, by those who deplore the way in which welfare 
provision privileges the lazy and the feckless over the responsible and
the deserving, as well as by those who simply believe in other fiscal or
macroeconomic priorities in what they say is a world of limited resources. 
These attacks cannot be dismissed; they require—and in my view, they
can be given—an answer.  But they are not adequately answered just by
saying that the case for welfare provision is urgent and should command
a very high place in the order of moral priorities.  Even if one can defend
the claim that socioeconomic rights are important, the nature of their 
priority over other concerns is not self-evident.  There are all sorts of 
priorities in this area of moral and political life, and we need to develop 
an articulate account of what kind of priority we are talking about.
For example, nobody these days seriously imagines an economy,
either at the national level or at the international level, in which private 
property and markets do not loom large, or in which the question of 
incentives for and rewards to the deserving are not thought important, or
in which there is not a multitude of other claims on the public purse—or 
a host of other macroeconomic concerns—competing with demands for 
welfare provision.  Though these considerations obviously compete with
claims about socioeconomic rights, they are not to be dismissed simply
on account of their being inimical to the latter claims.  They need to be
given their due in an overall account of what the organization of the 
basic structure of a society, national or international, ought to respond to.  
Formulating such an account, articulating and elaborating it, is precisely
the task of a theory of justice.
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Of course, existing philosophical defenses of socioeconomic rights 
already do a fair bit of this.13  They defend such rights against some of 
the more obvious criticisms, and they seek either to discredit property,
desert, and other fiscal priorities or to show that these are much less 
important than they claim to be.  It is not hard to make a rhetorically
convincing case along these lines, precisely because socioeconomic rights
purport to address the claims of direst need directly and vividly—and
often as a last resort—whereas the importance of these other competing 
claims—about property, markets, desert, and fiscal and macroeconomic
concerns—is presented a little further back from the margins of life and 
death.  Or to put it more crudely: it is easy for defenders of socioeconomic 
rights to make their opponents sound heartless.  But just that advantage 
should put us on warning that it might be worth exploring the competition 
between these various sorts of claims from other angles too, if only as a 
sort of reality check to ensure that our use of the rhetoric of dire need is 
not just a way of browbeating our opponents, bullying the moderates, 
and intoxicating ourselves with our own righteousness. 
On the other hand, I do not want to leave the impression that the 
disparity between the tone and rhetoric of argument for socioeconomic 
rights—intense, concrete, and passionately concerned—and the tone and
rhetoric of argument for theories of justice—dry, detached, abstract, and 
impossibly elaborate—is just a matter of personal style as between, say, 
welfare advocates and philosophers.  I certainly do not mean to suggest 
that defenders of socioeconomic rights cheat on their arguments or sell
short the sort of fundamental values, like respect for persons, human
dignity, autonomy, and basic equality, that ought to anchor our views about 
justice.  On the contrary, defenders of socioeconomic rights are second to 
none in their taking these fundamental premises seriously and in their 
determination to bring out the practical implications that they really
have for the concrete predicament of impoverished men, women, and
children in the world.  They rightly convey that arguing from premises
like these cannot be regarded as a game or as a mere academic exercise.
The disparity that interests me is not so much in the premises that are
used but in the conclusions that the respective bodies of argument are 
aiming at.  Although defenders of socioeconomic rights are interested in 
13. See, e.g., David Copp, The Right to an Adequate Standard of Living: Justice, 
Autonomy, and the Basic Needs, in ECONOMIC RIGHTS 231, 232–34 (Ellen Frankel Paul 
et al. eds., 1992). 
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arguing from fundamental premises for something quite specific, such as 
health care, social security, or minimum income, in a sort of line-item 
way, proponents of a theory of justice are arguing from fundamental 
premises for principles, such as the “Difference Principle,”14 that are 
intended to operate at a much more general level.  What I am urging 
when I say that it would be a good idea to bring these bodies of argument 
into some careful relation with one another is that we need to get a better 
sense of how the line-item claims that we call socioeconomic rights fit 
into a bigger picture that takes these fundamental values as seriously as 
the proponents of socioeconomic rights take them. 
I emphasize that last point.  The aim of this Article is not to haul
socioeconomic rights before some tribunal of efficiency or aggregate 
utility.  Critics who regard efficiency or aggregate utility as the be-all
and end-all of public policy have already committed serious mistakes:
they have an impoverished conception of value, and they pursue the
values that they recognize in an inappropriate way by concentrating on 
arithmetical aggregates rather than on individualized or distributive 
concerns.  Theorists of justice avoid mistakes like these.  They may not 
agree with one another about the proper conception of value for public
policy—welfare, primary goods, human capacities, et cetera—or what 
exactly the distributive structure of an appropriate theory ought to be.
But they are committed to evaluating social policy in terms that
take individuals seriously and that have the capacity to take the special
concerns of poor people seriously.  The game is not rigged against the 
distributive concerns of the theorist of socioeconomic rights like it is in
the economic critique.  One could say that to ask about the proper relation 
between a theory of social-economic rights and a theory of justice is to
ask a fair—as opposed to an unfair—question.
Benefits, I believe, will accrue to both sides if theories of socioeconomic
rights are brought together with theories of justice.  Theories of justice 
sometimes tend to consign their consideration of specific lines of public
policy to an afterthought, tacked onto the main structure and argued for 
half-heartedly and often superficially.  This is certainly true of the 
comments that Rawls makes about welfare provision and what he calls 
“the social minimum.”15  A clearer sense, within a theory of justice, of 
how particular public policy commitments could rise to the status of 
rights would improve matters.  Such consideration would fully take into
account the need to consider the public policy line in question in relation 
to other competing claims and commitments, but it would also be 
looking to justify it, in this context, as a right—as something that would
14. See RAWLS, supra note 4, at 65–73. 
15. See id. at 244–45. 
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have standing in public policy as a matter of principle, not just as a 
contingent and variable output of the theory.
Equally, from the point of view of the proponents of socioeconomic 
rights, I believe that pursuing the argument about these rights under the 
auspices of a theory of justice may enable us to make a better case for
them than arguing directly in the way their proponents currently do.
This is for the reason already mentioned: a theory of justice necessarily
brings together with the consideration of socioeconomic rights a
consideration of all the claims and principles with which such rights 
might be thought to compete or conflict.  If the resources that
socioeconomic rights require are scarce, relative to these and other
requirements, then it is to a theory of justice that we must look for 
allocation under scarcity.  Or if the resources that socioeconomic rights 
require are privately owned or subject in some other way to others’ 
claims, on the basis, for example, of labor, desert, or wealth creation, 
then we need more than a theory of socioeconomic rights to show that 
they should nevertheless be made available for welfare provision; we
need a theory of justice to provide a general matrix for considering and
reconciling these competing claims. The general point here is that 
theories of rights do good work when it comes to explaining why each
right is important, but they are notoriously bad at thinking about conflict 
or competition among rights or among claims that aspire to be treated as 
rights.16  Theories of justice may be a little too abstract for the taste of 
those who are used to line-item consideration of some quite concretely
specified rights, but their raison d’être is the consideration of competing 
claims and interests in a distributive context in which it is understood 
that not everyone can get what they want or even what we ideally would
like to secure for them.  It is surely appropriate, then, to bring this 
second perspective to bear on the first.
If it is known that the case for a right like that in ICESCR Article 
11(1)17 has been made without proper consideration of competing
claims, then the alleged right is easy to discredit, easy to dismiss as
naïve, and unrealistic.  If, however, the alleged socioeconomic right has 
been properly defended in the context of a theory of justice, then it may
16. For a sampling of the sparse literature on conflicts of rights, see Jeremy
Waldron, Rights in Conflict, 99 ETHICS 503, 503–06 (1989), and F.M. Kamm, Conflicts 
of Rights: Typology, Methodology, and Nonconsequentialism, 7 LEGAL THEORY 239, 
242–51 (2001). 
17. G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI) A, supra note 2, at 50–51. 
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be presented more confidently and more effectively in political and
philosophical argument.  Its presentation can be associated with a sense
that competing claims—to property, desert, or whatever—have had a fair
chance of consideration in a way that takes their normative aspirations 
seriously.  And this way of defending it will also be a way of illustrating 
and driving home the point that when claims of right are in the air,
recourse to a utilitarian or economic matrix is not always appropriate. 
What follows is not a comprehensive survey.  It is certainly not a 
comprehensive survey of theories of justice.  Rawls’s theory will often 
serve as an illustration, though in some places I will also consider Robert
Nozick’s theory of historical entitlement.  The aim, however, is not to 
oppose these theories to one another but rather to get a taste of the 
variety of ways in which claims about socioeconomic rights may figure 
into a broader theoretical conception.  Also, I will not offer an exhaustive 
review of the ways in which socioeconomic rights might be related to or 
emerge from a complex theory of justice.  I have chosen seven main 
areas to focus on: (1) the role of considered judgments about welfare and 
the relief of poverty in the formation of a theory of justice, (2) the 
importance of scarcity and issues of priority in defining the agenda for 
justice and the constraints facing the proponents of any costly right, (3) the 
difference between allocative and structural/procedural approaches to
justice, (4) the use of contractarian ideas to argue for particular principles of
justice, (5) the importance that a theory of justice will attach to choice 
and personal responsibility, (6) the relation between first-best and
second-best accounts, and (7) the relation between the more abstract and 
the more policy-oriented aspects of a theory of justice.  Other facets of 
the relationship are no doubt worth examining too, but the ones I have 
listed will be enough to begin with.  This Article is just a start; I hope it
affords a basis for others to build on. 
II. OUR CONSIDERED JUDGMENTS
Our theories of justice are motivated, driven, and to a certain extent 
constrained by what we sometimes call our intuitions about justice, but
which might more accurately be described as our considered but on-the-
whole pretheoretical judgments about some of the matters that justice 
deals with. Whether or not one adopts Rawls’s methodology of reflective 
equilibrium,18 these considered judgments play an important role both in
specifying what it is that we want to think about and also in fixing our 
sense of what we expect our theory of justice to validate or make sense
of.  They may also provide reality checks at various stages of our 
18. See RAWLS, supra note 4, at 40–46. 
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argumentation about justice; we may find a given theoretical position 
plausible or implausible—intuitively plausible or implausible as we
say—because of its consonance or dissonance with one or more of these
considered judgments. 
These judgments need not be just the sentiments of private individuals.
They may have the status among us of “precepts of justice”—commonsense
truths shared to a certain extent in the culture even among philosophers.19 
There is no doubt that claims about socioeconomic rights are supported 
by many of these judgments and precepts.  Many of us believe, for
example, that if a child is in danger of starvation in a society with a
prosperous economy and if the child’s parents are incapable of supporting
it, then there ought to be some provision for social support and that state-
run agencies have a responsibility to see that this is provided.  Many of
us would regard it as a serious objection to a theory of justice if it implied 
that this need not be done or that it should not be done.20 
Of course, nobody’s considered judgments are self-validating.  For 
one thing, considered judgments about provision for need may have to
be reconciled with other considered judgments of ours that seem to pull 
in an opposite direction.  Many people hold the view, pretheoretically, 
that individuals are entitled to the fruits of their labor—such as the 
income that others have paid them for work they have done—and they
19. See id. at 31–32. 
20. A lot of the early hostility to Robert Nozick’s theory stemmed from the fact 
that Nozick gave the impression that such provision might be unjust or at any rate not 
required by justice.  People thought that if Nozick’s was just one theory competing for 
our attention, this might be a reason to look elsewhere for theoretical illumination on the 
topic of justice.  See Brian Barry, Book Review, 3 POL. THEORY 331, 331–32 (1975) 
(reviewing NOZICK, supra note 10). 
[T]he intellectual texture is of a sort of cuteness that would be wearing in a 
graduate student and seems to me quite indecent in someone who, from the 
lofty heights of a professorial chair, is proposing to starve or humiliate ten
percent or so of his fellow citizens (if he recognizes the word) by eliminating 
all transfer payments through the state, leaving the sick, the old, the disabled, 
the mothers with young children and no breadwinner, and so on, to the tender
mercies of private charity, given at the whim and pleasure of the donors and on
any terms that they choose to impose. 
This is, no doubt, an emotional response, but there are, I believe, occasions 
when an emotional response is the only intellectually honest one. . . .  [A] book
whose argument would entail the repeal of even the Elizabethan Poor Law 
must either be regarded as a huge joke or as a case of trahison des clercs,
giving spurious intellectual respectability to the reactionary backlash that is 
already visible in other ways in the United States.
Id.
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believe that it would count against a theory of justice if that theory were 
to hold that their income were simply to be made available against their
will for the satisfying of other people’s needs.  These two judgments
may not directly contradict one another, but they are in tension, and the 
task of a theory of justice is to reconcile whatever is important in one
with whatever is important in the other, in the context of their application to
thousands or millions of individuals in a society or in the world.  If this 
is true, then we should not expect either judgment to survive its 
consideration in a theory of justice in an unmodified form. Our
considered judgments are like inputs into the theory, but the outputs may
look somewhat different.  Of course that is not inevitable; maybe one or 
another judgment will emerge largely intact.  But a theory of justice 
offers no guarantees in this regard, and this may be important for how 
we think about socioeconomic rights.  Inasmuch as the case for them is 
largely intuitive or based simply on the fact that they embody one set of
strong convictions that we hold, then we have to be open to the
possibility that they will not survive in the form that a simple rights 
slogan expresses when they emerge from serious consideration under the 
auspices of a theory of justice.
Also, a theory of justice may sometimes be radical or quite revisionary 
as far as our considered judgments are concerned.  People sometimes 
approach the topic of justice with a pretheoretical conviction that
individuals deserve certain things—for example, that hard-working and 
prudent people deserve the wealth that they have created on the basis of
the moral merit evinced in their abstemious industriousness.  (This too is 
sometimes put forward as being in tension with the “intuitions”
embodied in claims about socioeconomic rights.)  But in A Theory of
Justice, John Rawls criticizes such claims.  He does not just strike a 
different balance between the claims of need and the claims of desert; he
argues that the latter claims are mostly misconceived.21  He may or may 
not be right about that.  The point is that a theory of justice cannot 
promise immunity in advance against such revision to any set of
intuitions.22 
The role of considered judgments and precepts helps us understand the
complexity of the relation between rights and justice.  On the one hand,
our convictions about rights often present themselves to us as obvious, 
in a way that does not require much philosophical elaboration: “We hold
21. See RAWLS, supra note 4, at 88–89. 
22. See  LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP: TAXES AND
JUSTICE 173 (2002) (arguing that individuals are not really morally entitled to pretax
income).
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these truths to be self evident.”23  But theoretical work on justice gets
underway when it becomes apparent that not all of the things that appear 
self-evident (one by one) to a person or to the members of a group of 
people or to a whole society or civilization can be held together, at least
in unadulterated form.  This fact has convinced some people that the 
language of rights is inappropriate for political discourse: “It is from the 
beginning to the end so much flat assertion . . . .  It lays down as a 
fundamental and inviolable principle whatever is in dispute . . . .  The 
strength of this argument is in proportion to the strength of lungs in
those who use it.”24  But that is too extreme a reaction.  Intuitive
convictions about rights play a healthy role in stimulating theories of 
justice, and as we shall see, some of the conclusions of theorizing about 
justice are properly presented in the language of rights. 
III. SCARCITY AND ISSUES OF PRIORITY
Some critics argue that even considered as commonsense precepts, 
claims about socioeconomic rights have to be rejected because they 
violate the logical principle that ought implies can.25  Many states, say these
critics, do not have the resources to provide even minimal economic 
security for masses of their citizens, and because states differ considerably 
in this regard, it hardly makes sense to regard economic provision as a 
matter of universal human entitlement.26  A theory of justice will make 
this difficulty—if it is a difficulty—apparent at an early stage because its
entire apparatus is predicated upon a presupposition of scarcity: like the 
limited altruism of human beings, the scarcity of material resources is a
fact of life and a basic circumstance of all our talk about justice.27 
But the argument is too quick.  It is true that the resources and services 
that socioeconomic rights need to draw upon are scarce relative to the 
whole set of demands that are placed upon them.  But what this indicates 
is that there needs to be some sorting, balancing, and prioritization
among these demands.  It does not follow that one subset of the demands 
 23. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
 24. Jeremy Bentham, Anarchical Fallacies, in NONSENSE UPON STILTS: BENTHAM,
BURKE AND MARX ON THE RIGHTS OF MAN 46, 74 (Jeremy Waldron ed., 1987). 
25. See Waldron, supra note 16, at 506. 
26. See, e.g., Maurice Cranston, Human Rights, Real and Supposed, in POLITICAL 
THEORY AND THE RIGHTS OF MAN 43, 50–51 (D.D. Raphael ed., 1967). 
27. See RAWLS, supra note 4, at 109–12; see also  DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF
HUMAN NATURE 494–95 (L.A. Selby-Bigge & P. H. Nidditch eds., 1978). 
 783





















      
 
   




(socioeconomic rights) must be abandoned as impossible.  There is no 
reason to suppose that there are not enough resources in the world, say,
to feed, house, or provide basic medical care to everybody in it, as 
Articles 11 and 12 of ICESCR require.28  The difficulty is that there are 
also other demands on these resources—other fiscal priorities and other 
uses that individuals and firms might have for the income and wealth 
that would have to be taxed or otherwise accessed if fiscal capacity were
to be increased.  If it did follow from scarcity in this sense that we
should abandon some subset of the demands that are placed upon scarce 
resources, then we would need to hear arguments back and forth about 
which subset of demands this should be.  For example, weapons and 
military demands compete fiscally with demands for socioeconomic 
provision.  Why not abandon the former rather than the latter?  I do not 
mean this as a rhetorical question.  I mean to ask for an answer and to 
ask also for the hard work—including hard work in our theory of 
justice—that would be necessary to explain and defend a given answer.
These points are particularly important when it comes to thinking 
about the relation between socioeconomic claims and property rights. 
The alleged impossibility of socioeconomic claims—the difficulty with 
the idea that ought implies can—is often based on an assumption that the 
existing distribution of property is to remain largely undisturbed.  When 
a conservative government in the West says, for example, in response to
some plea for welfare provision, “The money simply isn’t there,” what is
usually meant is that it would be impolitic to try and raise it from
existing income earners by taxation.  But if resources are scarce relative
to human wants, any system of rights or entitlements will  seem  
demanding to those who are constrained by it.  If an economic system 
includes provision for welfare assistance, that may seem overly
demanding to taxpayers.  But if it does not include that provision, then 
the system of property rights in such an economy will seem overly 
demanding to the poor, requiring as it does that they refrain from making 
use of resources that they need in order to survive.  As usual, the
question is not whether we are to have a system of demanding rights but
how the costs of the demands are to be distributed. 
Robert Nozick may be guilty of a fallacy along these lines when he 
voices the following general misgiving about socioeconomic rights29: 
The major objection to speaking of everyone’s having a right to various
things such as equality of opportunity, life, and so on, and enforcing this right, 
is that these “rights” require a substructure of things and materials and
actions; and other people may have rights and entitlements over these. No
28. See G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI) A, supra note 2, at 50–52. 
29. The remainder of this Part is adapted from Waldron, supra note 10. 
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one has a right to something whose realization requires certain uses of things 
and activities that other people have rights and entitlements over.  Other 
people’s rights and entitlements to particular things (that pencil, their body, and
so on) and how they choose to exercise these rights and entitlements fix the 
external environment of any given individual and the means that will be
available to him. . . .
There are particular rights over particular things held by particular persons, 
and particular rights to reach agreements with others, if you and they together
can acquire the means to reach an agreement. . . .  No rights exist in conflict
with this substructure of particular rights. Since no neatly contoured 
[socioeconomic] right . . . will avoid incompatibility with this substructure, no
such rights exist.  The particular rights over things fill the space of rights,
leaving no room for general rights to be in a certain material condition.  The 
reverse theory would place only such universally held general “rights to”
achieve goals or to be in a certain material condition into its substructure so as 
to determine all else; to my knowledge no serious attempt has been made to
state this “reverse” theory.30 
Nozick’s argument here assumes that claims based on need occupy a
relatively superficial role in a general theory of economic entitlement.  It
is as though we first figure out who owns what, applying the principles 
that determine property rights, and then figure out whose needs are left
unsatisfied and what is to be done about them.  On this approach, 
socioeconomic rights—if there are any—live only in the interstices of 
property.  Some of what Nozick says suggests that this subordination of 
welfare to property is more or less unavoidable: “Things come into the 
world already attached to people having entitlements over them.”31  He
thinks this is clearest in the case of body parts: you may need these 
kidneys or this retina, but my entitlement to them is necessarily prior to 
yours for we cannot even grasp my status as a person without comprising in
that status a rightful claim to the limbs, cells, and organs that make me 
who I am.32 He thinks it holds for some external objects as well, 
appealing to the intuition we cited earlier: “Isn’t it implausible that how 
holdings are produced and come to exist has no effect at all on who 
should hold what?”33  The trouble with socioeconomic rights, on this
account, is that they “treat objects as if they appeared from nowhere, out 
of nothing.”34 
Nozick’s position is that “particular rights over things fill the space of 
rights, leaving no room for general rights to be in a certain material 
 30. NOZICK, supra note 10, at 238. 
31. Id. at 160. 
32. Id. at 206. 
33. Id. at 155. 
34. Id. at 160. 
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condition.”35 He maintains that the alternative is to stipulate the
socioeconomic rights first and then try to fit property entitlements 
around them, and he says in the long passage I quoted that no serious 
attempt has been made to state this reverse theory.36  In fact, Nozick’s
own view has certain features that involve exactly the alternative 
structure he is referring to here.  Nozick, like John Locke before him, 
believes that the initial acquisition of property rights must not be
conducted in a way that is indifferent to the predicament of needy
individuals who might be constrained by the rights in question.  Nozick 
is committed to the following proposition, as a proviso qualifying his 
account of the acquisition of property:
A process normally giving rise to a permanent bequeathable property right in a 
previously unowned thing will not do so if the position of others no longer at
liberty to use the thing is thereby worsened.37 
What is this, if it is not a statement of what Nozick called the reverse 
theory?  It gives priority to the right not to have one’s material situation 
worsened, whether that situation consists in holding property rights or 
just in having access of some kind to the resources needed for a decent
life.  It gives these rights priority in exactly the sense that the reverse
theory is supposed to give priority to socioeconomic rights: property
entitlements must work around them, and no such entitlements are 
recognized if they are incompatible with these rights. 
Nor is this an inadvertent slip on Nozick’s part. Almost all
philosophical defenders of private property acknowledge the need to
develop principles for the acquisition and use of property that respect 
each person’s fundamental right to derive sustenance from this world 
35. Id. at 238. 
36. Id.  In fact some philosophers have toyed with versions of such a reverse 
approach.  In Property Rights and Interests, Virginia Held compared acquisitive
economic activity to a game, “where winners and losers compete on friendly terms as if
engaged in a sporting event.”  Virginia Held, Property Rights and Interests, 46 SOC. RES. 
550, 577 (1979).  The idea was that winners are allowed to keep their winnings and
“losers may prefer having had a chance to play the game, and especially having a chance
to play again and win, than to . . . be assured all along of an even apportionment of all 
proceeds.”  Id.  But Held did not think that this game-playing could trump
socioeconomic rights: 
Economic justice is a serious matter. While those with moral rights to decent
lives are deprived of these rights, playing games is not only frivolous but 
immoral.  However, if such rights were respected . . . and if, on utilitarian grounds, 
playing economic games could be justified in terms of the maximization of 
interests, well then there might be nothing wrong with capitalist games 
between consenting gamblers . . . .  But first, the children ought to be fed.
Id. at 579. 
 37. NOZICK, supra note 10, at 178. 
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that is our common heritage.38  Few are willing to say that property 
rights are justified utterly without reference to the interests or needs of 
those whom they exclude from access to resources.  The reason is obvious: 
to justify a property right in X is not only to feel justified in oneself’s
coercively excluding others from X but to justify other people’s recognition 
of a duty to refrain from using X even when one is not around oneself to 
physically defend it.
My reason for including this lengthy consideration of Nozick’s 
proviso is to help us see that a theory of justice may take on board
compelling principles about human need in ways that are unfamiliar or 
disconcerting.  We were expecting to see them surface as freestanding 
rights, yet here they surface as conditions or provisos on principles of
historic entitlement.  Someone may claim, of course, that although Nozick’s
proviso does represent a way of acknowledging the sort of needs that are 
also acknowledged in claims of socioeconomic rights, it is not an
adequate way of acknowledging the force of such considerations.  But 
that will have to be argued.  We are not proceeding with any guarantee 
that the form in which welfare considerations emerge in a theory of
justice exactly matches the form in which they present themselves in our 
considered judgments, in our commonsense precepts, or for that matter 
in some legal or internal formulations. 
Certainly, Nozick’s way of thinking about the relation between the 
claims of need and claims related to property in the context of a theory 
of justice is not the only way we can think about this.  In Part V, I shall
consider the quite different way Rawls deals with these matters in
chapter 5 of A Theory of Justice.39  Rawls’s approach is probably more
congenial to defenders of socioeconomic rights than Nozick’s.  But I 
have to say again: we are not entitled to take the emergence of a
familiar-looking socioeconomic right as a criterion of adequacy for a 
theory of justice.  Adequacy means that the relevant claims have been
given proper consideration, not that the conclusion coincides with the
views we began with. 
38. For a survey, see THOMAS A. HORNE, PROPERTY RIGHTS AND POVERTY:
POLITICAL ARGUMENT IN BRITAIN (1990).  John Locke, for example, recognizes it by
allowing a right of recourse to all property in the last resort for the needy. See  JOHN 
LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 205–06 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. 
Press 1960) (1690). 
 39. See infra Part V. 
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IV. ALLOCATION VERSUS STRUCTURE AND PROCEDURE
One might think about the relation between a theory of justice and 
socioeconomic rights in the following way:
 Distributive justice involves choosing criteria for the distribution of something
valuable, such as money or other goods, among people who have some claim
upon a common stock or a common fund.  These criteria are embodied in 
principles.  One possible allocative principle is Pn: “To each according to one’s
needs.”  So a belief in socioeconomic rights is a belief that something like this
distributive principle should be one of the outputs that a theory of justice comes 
up with, and that it should be applied to the resources that society has at its 
disposal.  Of course there are other candidates; for example, Pd, “To each
according to one’s desert,” is an alternative principle that is often heard.  To 
think that there are socioeconomic rights, therefore, is to think that theorizing
about distributive justice will show that Pn is a correct principle, at least over
some important range of needs, and that Pd is not a correct principle to the
extent that it is incompatible with Pn. 
Theories of distributive justice that aspire to yield principles like Pn or 
Pd are sometimes called allocative theories.  Allocative theories have a
venerable history in the discussion of justice: they have a prominent 
place in Aristotle’s discussion of distributive justice, particularly in his 
discussion of the proper distribution of political power in The Politics.40 
But most modern theorists of justice reject the allocative approach or at
best confine it to a very special range of cases where there is a common
stock of resources on which a number of identifiable individuals have
undoubted—but so far unquantified—claims.  The division of matrimonial
assets upon divorce might be an example. 
Robert Nozick’s theory is adamantly opposed to the allocative approach. 
The reason is straightforward: allocation treats goods as though they
were simply there, awaiting distribution, as though the process by which
they were produced had no relevance.  It is part of his rejection of what 
he calls patterned principles—principles that try to pattern the distribution
of goods on something else like need or desert:
Isn’t it implausible that how holdings are produced and come to exist has no
effect at all on who should hold what? 
 . . . .
To think that the task of a theory of distributive justice is to fill in the blank in 
“to each according to his ____” is to be predisposed to search for a pattern; and
the separate treatment of “from each according to his ____” treats production
and distribution as two separate and independent issues.  On an entitlement view
these are not two separate questions.41 
40. See  ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 113, 116–18 (Martin Ostwald trans., 
Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1962); ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS, reprinted in THE POLITICS AND THE
CONSTITUTION OF ATHENS 9, 63, 67, 71, 78–79 (Stephen Everson ed., 1996). 
 41. NOZICK, supra note 10, at 155, 159–60. 
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Nozick’s own substantive position is that “[w]hoever makes something . . .
is entitled to it.”42  But we need not accept this in order to accept his 
critique of the allocative approach.  His view is one way of linking
productive and distributive issues together; there may be others.  The 
more abstract point is that they ought to be linked and that justice ought
to deal with both of them together.  We need principles of justice to
apply not to distribution considered apart from production or vice versa 
but to the structure of production enmeshed with distribution that we are 
likely to see in a real working economy.
The holistic emphasis on structure, as opposed to distributive questions
posed in isolation, is typical of Rawls’s approach as well.  Rawls too is 
anxious that the task of a theory of justice not be understood simply as 
an allocation of distributive shares: who gets what when and how?  “We
must not assume,” he says, “that there is much similarity from the
standpoint of justice between an administrative allotment of goods to 
specific persons and the appropriate design of society.”43  He also says
that “[i]f it is asked in the abstract whether one distribution of a given 
stock of things to definite individuals . . . is better than another, then 
there is simply no answer to this question.”44  Thus, for example, Rawls’s
Difference Principle is not to be interpreted as dictating that the worst-
off group be given a certain share of resources.45  Instead, the effect of 
the principle is that when we are designing or, more likely, evaluating 
and reforming the network of rules and procedures that constitute the 
institutional structure of society, we should do so in a way that is oriented
towards the advantage of the worst-off group.  The institutions should be
designed to operate on the assumption that when the system is working, 
outcomes are evaluated purely procedurally.  We are not to meddle with
the outcomes of a just institutional structure even if we think that by
42. Id. at 160. 
 43. RAWLS, supra note 4, at 56. 
44. Id. at 76. 
45. The Difference Principle certainly reveals a spirit congenial to something like
welfare provision inasmuch as it requires particular attention to the plight of the worst-
off members of society.  On the other hand, it also suggests that it is possible to justify
great inequalities, which on some accounts it is the task of socioeconomic rights to
mitigate.  In general, the Difference Principle is too abstract to generate, by itself, any 
particular case for welfare provision. It is a principle governing the most abstract 
distributive implications of the basic structure, and it deals with them holistically,
without regard to particular institutional arrangements or sources of advantage or 
disadvantage.  If the Difference Principle provides the basis of a case for socioeconomic 
rights, it does so in the context of its detailed elaboration.
 789




























doing so we could make the array of outcomes even more just from a 
distributive point of view. 
In a book on social justice published in the mid-1970s, F.A. Hayek
took these comments by Rawls to indicate that the difference between
Rawls’s approach and his own approach is “more verbal than substantial.”46 
Rawls’s work, he says, has been “wrongly . . . interpreted as lending 
support to socialist demands.”47  He takes Rawls to agree with his own 
central claim that “[j]ustice is not concerned with those unintended
consequences of a spontaneous order [such as a market] which have not
been deliberately brought about by anybody.”48 
I think that Hayek is mistaken about this and that he exaggerates the 
implications of Rawls’s refusal to consider the justice of particular 
allocations of goods.  Rawls’s position may be illuminated as follows: 
Suppose that, on one occasion, the institutions of our economy happen to
yield a distribution of wealth, D1, that is judged inferior in terms of the 
Difference Principle to another distribution, D2.  Should we immediately
interfere and reallocate wealth so that we change D1 into D2?  Rawls’s 
answer, like Hayek’s, is “no.”  For Hayek the matter ends there.  But for
Rawls there is a further question to be addressed: can we change the 
institutional structure so as to render it more likely in the future that the 
normal operation of our economy will yield distributions like D2 rather
than D1?  The answer to this may also be “no” because the proposed 
change might be incompatible with institutional virtues such as
publicity, stability, and the rule of law.49  The new institutions that are 
being suggested may not, as it were, hold up as institutions.  Still—and 
this is what Hayek overlooks—the answer is not necessarily “no.”  If 
change is possible and if the resulting institutional structure would be 
viable, stable, et cetera, then we are required as a matter of justice to 
implement it for the Difference Principle just is the requirement that we
arrange—and, if necessary, rearrange—our institutions so that social and
economic inequalities are to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged.
So, for example, if we find ourselves in a market society that lacks basic
welfare provision, we have to consider whether the institutional structure 
of a market economy would be wrecked qua institutional structure by the 
addition of what Rawls calls a “transfer branch” charged with administering 
a social minimum.50  Would that make it impossible for the economic 
structure as a whole to operate predictably, publicly, impersonally, and
 46. 2 F.A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: THE MIRAGE OF SOCIAL
JUSTICE xiii (1976). 
47. Id. at 100, 183 n.44. 
48. Id. at 38, 166 n.19. 
 49. RAWLS, supra note 4, at 48–49, 206–13. 
50. Id. at 244–45. 
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in accordance with other institutional virtues?  Hayek has devoted a
large part of his life to arguing that it would: that the modern regulated 
welfare state is incompatible with the rule of law.51  It is pretty clear that
Rawls disagrees with him about that.52  But the deeper disagreement is 
that Rawls thinks it is the job of a theory of justice to select principles
for evaluating economic institutions along exactly these lines, whereas 
Hayek simply denies that that is a legitimate concern about justice. 
I have taken this digression into the Hayek-Rawls misunderstanding 
because I want to stress again that in a theory of justice like Rawls’s, we 
cannot guarantee that socioeconomic rights will emerge in a familiar or
predictable form.  As an abstract matter we can say, with the drafters of
Article 25 of the UDHR, that everyone has “the right to a standard of 
living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and his
family.”53  But that may not necessarily emerge as a specific legal or 
constitutional guarantee: a just society may not have a rule to that effect
or even any particular agency charged with administering this standard. 
There may be a variety of provisions and arrangements, ranging from tax
breaks to educational opportunities to rent control to unemployment 
insurance schemes, all of which taken together may represent the best— 
and genuinely the best—that can be done in an institutional framework
to honor the underlying claim for the individuals in whose behalf it can
be made. 
V. CONTRACTARIAN ARGUMENTS FOR PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE
I said at the beginning of this Article that it is not devoted specifically
to John Rawls’s theory of justice or to the implications of that particular 
theory for socioeconomic rights.  Still, Rawls’s theory is a good
paradigm to work with, and it has contributed to the study of justice a 
number of ideas that have more general application.  One of them is the 
contractarian idea of the original position: the idea that it might be 
fruitful to approach questions of justice by imagining people making 
decisions about important structural aspects of their society or about 
important political and legal principles that they were to be committed to 
51. See FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 72–73 (1944); F.A. HAYEK,
THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 205–06 (1960). 
52. Otherwise he would not take it for granted that a just basic structure will have
a transfer branch that “guarantees a certain level of well-being and honors the claims of 
need.” RAWLS, supra note 4, at 244. 
53. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, supra note 1, at 76. 
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from behind a veil of ignorance, in which they prescinded from all
knowledge of their own particulars that might give them an idea of how 
such arrangements would impact on their own well-being.54  So, for  
example, people might be required to imagine considering arrangements
about racial discrimination without knowing what race they belonged to 
or arrangements about the state’s relation to religion without knowing 
what religion they belonged to. 
Would it be appropriate to approach the principles underlying
socioeconomic rights from this perspective?  Could one argue, for
example, that principles roughly similar to those that I mentioned at the 
beginning of this Article—the principles of socioeconomic rights 
that one finds in the UDHR, the ICESCR, or the South African
Constitution—might emerge from a contractarian theory as the upshot of
asking what people would agree to from behind the Rawlsian veil of
ignorance? 
In light of what was said in Part IV, one might imagine a Rawlsian 
response to the effect that a nonallocative theory simply does not
generate principles of that sort in this direct way.  Rawls might say that 
if justice requires welfare payments, for example, then that will emerge 
in the course of the detailed elaboration of what is implied as a matter of 
public policy by the very abstract propositions that are the subject matter 
of decision in the original position.  (We will examine this in Part VIII.)
But, he will say, it misconstrues the order of argument in Rawls’s 
conception to think that welfare can emerge as a matter of right as a result 
of directly applying the idea of choice behind the veil of ignorance. 
But actually that is not quite right, at least as far as Rawls’s own 
theory is concerned.  The “First Principle” of Rawls’s conception of
justice as fairness contains what he refers to as “equal basic liberties,”
under which heading we find many principles that are regarded as 
human rights.55  These include political liberties, freedom of speech and 
assembly, liberty of conscience and freedom of thought, freedom of the 
person, and freedom from arbitrary arrest.56  According to Rawls, these 
are argued for directly using the idea of the original position.57  For  
example, the argument for the right of freedom of conscience is that
“persons in the original position . . . . cannot take chances with their 
liberty by permitting the dominant religious or moral doctrine to 
54. For other uses of contractarian or quasi-contractarian approaches, see BRUCE 
A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 327–28 (1980), and T.M.
SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER 189–90 (1998). 
 55. RAWLS, supra note 4, at 53. 
56. Id.
57. Id. at 181. 
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persecute or suppress others if it wishes.”58  So we might ask, If this is 
an appropriate way of arguing for rights of religious liberty, why would 
it not also be an appropriate way of arguing for other rights such as 
socioeconomic rights? 
One contrast between a theory of justice and a theory of rights is that 
although the latter is often just presented as a list without addressing
issues of conflict and priority, the former aspires to a more unified and 
systematic account.  But in fact, Rawls’s theory of justice turns out to
have some list-like aspects too.  “[I]t is essential,” he says, “to observe
that the basic liberties are given by a list of such liberties.”59  This might
encourage us to think that we could just insert a list of social and
economic rights in our theory of justice, as Rawls inserted a list of civil 
and political rights in his First Principle.  In a later discussion, Rawls says:
Some may think that to specify the basic liberties by a list is a makeshift
which a philosophical conception of justice should do without.  We are 
accustomed to moral doctrines presented in the form of general definitions and
comprehensive first principles.  Note, however, that if we can find a list of
liberties which . . . leads the parties in the original position to agree to these
principles rather than to the other principles of justice available to them, then
what we may call “the initial aim” of justice as fairness is achieved.  This aim is 
to show that the two principles of justice provide a better understanding of the 
claims of freedom and equality in a democratic society than the first principles
associated with the traditional doctrines of utilitarianism.60 
He goes on to say that, for this purpose, the list can be drawn up by
considering “which liberties are essential social conditions for the 
adequate development and full exercise . . . of moral personality over a 
complete life,” and we bring that together with a survey of “the
constitutions of democratic states,” particularly those that have worked
well, to see which of these liberties are normally protected.61  We might
try out various lists, moving back and forth between the criteria just 
mentioned and a sense of what would be accepted in the original position, 
until we have come up with a “last preferred list.”62 
Well, then, we might say that there is no reason why such a
methodology should not take us beyond traditional civil and political 
rights into the realm of socioeconomic rights.  Prominent international 
58. Id.
59. Id. at 53. 
 60. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 292 (1996). 
61. Id. at 292–93. 
62. Id. at 293. 
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human rights instruments now include these as do certain well-
functioning constitutions, such as that of South Africa.  Those who 
believe in such rights defend them by arguing that they indeed represent
“essential social conditions for the adequate development and full 
exercise . . . of moral personality.”63  And as we shall see in a moment, 
there might well be a direct original-position argument to be made
in their favor.  If all this is true, then the list-ness of socioeconomic 
rights—the fact that they are not theorized in the way that theories of
justice normally theorize things—need not be an obstacle, at least if we 
accept the general outlines of Rawls’s methodology in this regard and
buy into his rejection of the criticism—which is more or less a version of 
the criticism with which I began this Part—that the use of such a list of 
rights in a theory of justice is a disreputable “makeshift.” 
All that is quite persuasive.  On the other hand, there may possibly be
reasons specifically for not treating socioeconomic rights in this manner,
which do not apply straightforwardly to the civil and political liberties 
on Rawls’s list.  Consider, for example, Rawls’s reasons for not including 
the fair value of liberty—the material resources that enable one to use
one’s liberties to one’s advantage—under the heading of the First 
Principle.  Rawls writes: 
The inability to take advantage of one’s rights and opportunities as a result of
poverty and ignorance, and a lack of means generally, is sometimes counted
among the constraints definitive of liberty.  I shall not, however, say this, but 
rather I shall think of these things as affecting the worth of liberty.64 
The point of this distinction is not to heartlessly brush aside questions 
about poverty and lack of means.  Rawls did not believe that a society 
could pride itself on offering its poorer citizens civil and political rights, 
in this narrow sense, without paying any attention to their material
condition.  But it is precisely the task of the “Second Principle” governing 
social and economic inequalities to pay attention to this matter.  The 
connection between a liberty and the worth of that liberty binds the two
principles of justice together by indicating the importance of economic 
well-being in determining whether the liberties governed by the First
Principle are actually worth having.  But if the worth of liberty had to be 
dealt with under the First Principle, there would be precious little for the 
Second Principle to deal with because almost all of the primary goods
affected by the Second Principle have some direct or indirect relevance 
to the effective use that one can make of the rights governed by the First 
Principle. 
63. Id.
 64. RAWLS, supra note 4, at 179. 
794
WALDRON POST-AUTHOR PAGES FINAL TO PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 9/23/2011 1:21 PM       



























[VOL. 48:  773, 2011] Socioeconomic Rights and Theories of Justice 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
In general, it is arguable that the civil and political liberties on Rawls’s 
list can be dealt with qua rights separately from the other concerns of a 
theory of justice.  In and of themselves, the civil and political liberties do
not have massive implications for the issues of social and economic 
distribution that Rawls’s other principle addresses.65  (I do not mean that
civil and political rights have no resource implications at all; I mean that
their resource implications are patchy, sporadic, and often indirect.) 
Socioeconomic rights, on the other hand, have very substantial
implications, both for the resources that Rawls’s Second Principle is 
likely to govern and for the basis of our overall assessment of the impact
of the basic structure on people’s life prospects.  This means, first, that if
socioeconomic rights were included in the First Principle, then the First 
Principle would do much of the work supposedly allocated to the Second 
Principle.66  And it means, second, that if socioeconomic rights were 
inserted in this fashion anywhere in Rawls’s theory—not necessarily
under the auspices of the First Principle—then it would turn out to be the 
case that a very substantial part of the work of the theory would consist
simply in a list of rights, and its systematic theoretical character would 
be largely lost.  One gets the impression that some if not most of the
conclusions of Rawls’s theory are supposed to be presented as derivations
from “general definitions and comprehensive first principles,” even if
the list of basic liberties is not.67  But if socioeconomic rights are
articulated in the way we have been imagining, then it will be the case 
that the whole theory begins to look makeshift, not just a part of it.
All of this leaves open the possibility, however, that when it comes to
the elaboration and defense of his Second Principle, Rawls might be 
constrained by the original-position method to include fundamental 
constraints that require attention to the issue of poverty and deprivation. 
After all, the Second Principle is itself complex: it conjoins the Difference 
Principle with a Principle of Equal Opportunity that constrains its 
65. See  STEPHEN HOLMES & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST OF RIGHTS 115–16
(1999); HENRY SHUE, BASIC RIGHTS 75–76 (1980). 
 66. H.L.A. Hart, Rawls on Liberty and Its Priority, in READING RAWLS 230, 236– 
37 (Norman Daniels ed., 1989) made an analogous criticism of Rawls’s early suggestion 
that the First Principle governed the distribution of liberty in general, not just specific 
basic liberties.  Because all resource allocation involves the allocation of liberty via the
right to use and the right to exclude, such an agenda would cover the whole domain of
resource use. 
 67. RAWLS, supra note 60, at 292. 
 795


















   
 
     
 










operation, and it is not unimaginable that we might say that one or both
of these are also constrained by something like socioeconomic rights.68 
Would persons in the original position insist on such constraints?  The 
answer is “possibly, yes”—in fact, the claim that they would insist on
some such constraint might be more plausible than the claim that they
would adopt the Difference Principle as that is ordinarily understood.
Let me explain.  Rawls’s own view is that any individual behind the veil 
of ignorance choosing principles to govern the basic structure of society 
in which the individual was to live would insist on a principle that 
ensured social and economic inequalities were regulated to the advantage,
in the first instance, of the least well-off group.69  This is the Rawlsian 
Difference Principle.  (As we have seen, that principle is not itself
supposed to determine what anyone is entitled to, but it would not be 
surprising if it commanded the institution of something like a modern
system of tax and transfer.)  Many critics, however, find it incredible
that people in the original position would be so solicitous of the worst-
off group in all circumstances.70  They concede that such solicitude
might be intelligible on the assumption that members of the worst-off 
group are suffering serious deprivation.  But if everyone is enjoying
great luxury, it seems odd to commit oneself to a principle that we must
always pay attention to plight of members of the group enjoying the least
luxury, sacrificing if necessary the possibility of more luxury overall.
This suggests that the reasons for parties in the original position to 
choose something like the Difference Principle evaporate as the actual
level of well-being of the worst-off group improves.  Of course, the 
parties behind the veil of ignorance are assumed not to know what the 
level of general prosperity is, but they might adopt a conditional 
principle.  They might say, “If the worst-off group is below a certain
(specified) absolute level of deprivation, then all social and economic 
inequalities should be oriented to their advantage; if they are above that 
level of deprivation, then that exclusive concern may not be
appropriate.”  In other words, individuals choosing from behind the veil 
of ignorance might explicitly adopt some principle of social minimum.71 
They might reason, for example, that they should make all efforts to
avoid radical deprivation of a sort that might undermine the most 
important aspects of human functioning: the nutrition necessary for 
ordinary action and reproduction, the shelter and clothing necessary for 
68. Id. at 53–55. 
69. Id. at 130–60. 
70. Id. at 68; see also ADAM SWIFT, POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 26–27 (2d ed. 2006). 
71. A principle oriented to the social minimum would be different from the social 
minimum policy discussed by Rawls. See RAWLS, supra note 4, at 244–45, 251–52; see 
also JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS 127–29 (Erin Kelly ed., 2001). 
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life, and so on.  They might figure that serious limitations on the upside 
prospects of social arrangements would be justified for the sake of 
avoiding these desperate possibilities.  If this was their approach, then 
they would, in effect, have adopted something very similar to what we 
call socioeconomic rights—rights calculated to ensure that those in a 
society who are materially radically disadvantaged are, if possible,
raised by collective provision above the level of radical disadvantage.72 
It seems to me that this is the most promising avenue for the
generation of something like a fundamental right to welfare provision. 
But it is worth noting that given the level at which it emerges in, say, a 
neo-Rawlsian theory of justice, there is much more work to be done 
before we can conclude that such a theory requires that people in a well-
ordered society actually be vested with such a right.  (I will discuss this 
further in Part VIII.) 
VI. CHOICE AND PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY
Many of those who would benefit if socioeconomic rights were
recognized are destitute and in need of the assistance that these rights 
afford through no fault of their own.  Others, however, are destitute 
because of bad choices they have made.  Some are in need because of 
sheer bad luck that has nothing to do with choices they made; others are
in need because they chose to take, and hoped to benefit from, a risk that
had penury as one of its possible outcomes.  Again, some are in need of 
the help that such rights require because neither they nor their parents
nor their grandparents ever had access to anything remotely like a fair
share of their society’s—or the world’s—wealth or a fair opportunity to
make a decent and self-sufficient life for themselves.  But this is not true
of everyone, for some may have squandered a fair share and need
assistance now on account of their own lack of prudence.
It is possible to defend socioeconomic rights in a way that makes 
distinctions like these irrelevant at a certain level of compelling need.  A 
starving person is a starving person, we might say, and they have a right 
to our help even when they are responsible for their predicament or even
72. Elsewhere I have argued that this position is also supported by what Rawls 
says about the impact of “strains of commitment” on reasoning in the original position. 
See Jeremy Waldron, John Rawls and the Social Minimum, 3 J. APPLIED PHIL. 21, 21
(1986), reprinted in JEREMY WALDRON, LIBERAL RIGHTS: COLLECTED PAPERS 1981– 
1991, at 250, 250 (1993).  
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when they have previously been given a fair share as far as the 
requirements of distributive justice are concerned.  However, it is widely
believed—certainly as a matter of pretheoretic considered judgment— 
that these distinctions are not altogether irrelevant for a theory of justice.
It is possible, I guess, that a theory of justice might repudiate these
distinctions altogether.  Sometimes Rawls gives that impression in his 
comments about desert.73 And neither the argument for the Difference 
Principle nor the Rawlsian social minimum argument I outlined in the 
previous Part seems to pay any attention to the question of individuals’ 
own responsibilities for their membership in the worst-off group.74 Still, 
we might insist, a theory of justice is inadequate if it says nothing to
address this question or allay the concerns that it raises.  Even if it is 
believed that choice and responsibility should not matter at the extremity
of need, still some account must be given of the intuitions that underlie 
these concerns about choice and responsibility and of why these 
intuitions do not always have the importance that their proponents say 
they have.
Some theories of justice have made these distinctions fundamental.  In 
Ronald Dworkin’s account of equality of resources, for example, we are 
to think in terms of a model in which each person is assigned an equal 
share of resources—configured by processes that treat the person as an
equal in determining how things should be divided or how nonfungible 
items should be treated.75 But once resources are assigned, we assume
that holdings will quickly become unequal as a result of various processes: 
Some may be more skillful than others at producing what others want and will 
trade to get.  Some may like to work, or to work in a way that will produce more
to trade, while others like not to work or prefer to work at what will bring them
less.  Some will stay healthy while others fall sick, or lightning will strike the 
farms of others but avoid theirs.  For any of these and dozens of other reasons
some people will prefer the bundle others have in say, five years, to their own.76 
Some of the hardest work required by Dworkin’s model then involves 
distinguishing, among these various ways in which people’s holdings 
might become unequal, those that represent the results of fair choices— 
investments, gambles, preferences for leisure over work—and those that
represent brute bad luck.  It has always been Dworkin’s position that one 
does not treat people as equals if one requires that they be insulated from 
the consequences of their own free choices.  People who worked or 
saved in order that they would have enough resources for a rainy day are 
 73. RAWLS, supra note 4, at 273–77. 
74. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, IS DEMOCRACY POSSIBLE HERE? 103–04 (2006). 
 75. Ronald Dworkin, What Is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources, 10 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 283 (1981). 
76. Id. at 293–94. 
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not treated with equal dignity if they are required to subsidize people 
who did not work or save, despite being conscious of what the 
consequences of that would be and despite having had the opportunity to
do so.  As Dworkin puts it in his most recent book, ideals of equality and 
justice must treat us as having in the first instance a responsibility to 
determine by our own choices how our lives should go.77  But  
opportunities for work or savings may not have been equal; people may
be handicapped or struck by illness, and in these instances a plausible 
case can be made for social assistance that does not involve an affront to 
the dignity of personal responsibility.  What the extent of that assistance 
should be is determined in Dworkin’s model by imagining various 
markets, actual and hypothetical, for insurance.  People who begin with 
equal holdings are imagined also to have had a fair and equal
opportunity to insure against bad luck, such as illness or unemployment. 
If such insurance opportunities are not available—again through no fault 
of their own—then they are said to be entitled to the assistance that they
would have received in a fair insurance market had such a market
existed.  The details of this account need not detain us here.  What is 
important to understand is that these model-theoretic assumptions—an
equal initial assignment of resources, responsibility for chosen outcomes 
even when these are unequal, and the provision of either an equal 
opportunity to insure against brute bad luck or the payouts that a fair 
insurance market would have provided—work in the infrastructure of
the theory to provide perspectives for thinking about the actual hazards
and inequalities of the real world.  Dworkin is not arguing for the setting 
up of any particular social insurance mechanisms as a matter of policy; 
instead he is using these devices as a way of thinking through the
tangled issues about choice, luck, and responsibility that he believes are 
unavoidable in a theory of justice. 
Dworkin’s is just one theory; there are other theories of justice that 
engage in similar analysis.  And there are some—like Rawls’s theory, as
we have seen—that give these issues much less prominence.  It may
seem that a proponent of socioeconomic rights—someone who takes 
seriously Article 11(1) of the ICESCR: “[T]he right of everyone to an
adequate standard of living for himself and his family”78—should always
favor theories of the latter kind over theories of the former kind.  But 
77. See RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS 330 (2011). 
78. G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI) A, supra note 2, at 50. 
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quite apart from general difficulties of derivation, that assumes that we
already know what socioeconomic rights are justified; it assumes we 
have already chosen between, say, the conditional formulations in 
UDHR Article 25(1)79 and the unconditional formulation from ICESCR 
just quoted.  One is entitled to ask, How can we know that without
having considered what is to be said in favor of a theory of justice of the
Dworkinian kind as against a theory of justice of the Rawlsian or neo-
Rawlsian kind?  We cannot just “intuit” it because, as we saw in Part II,
our intuitions on this are all over place. There is no substitute for doing 
the hard work that theorizing about justice requires, and that involves 
thinking through what might actually justify taking sides in the Rawls-
Dworkin dispute. 
VII. SECOND-BEST THEORY
In actual fact, no one has been assigned an initially equal share of 
resources, nor have most people had an opportunity to insure themselves 
in a fair market against lack of talent, disability, or various forms of bad 
luck.  They are stuck in the real world, cursed with a heritage of what
almost anyone would have to describe as injustice, and that is the world 
in which they suffer unemployment, deprivation, and insecurity, in 
which their children go hungry, and in which they have to make
whatever appalling choices are left open to them.  Rawls’s theory is
similarly unrealistic.  None of us was put in an original position and 
asked what principles we would choose to put up with or what principles 
we would be able to put up with to govern the basic structure of our 
society.  To the extent it is governed by principles at all, the basic 
structure of our society is governed by principles manifestly rigged to 
the advantage of some and the detriment of others.  Or even when it is
governed by fair principles, we play the game that those principles 
define—such as the market game—with radically disparate initial
endowments of property and other resources.  Even Nozick acknowledges
the prominence of injustice in the real world.  No one thinks that current
holdings of property are respectable by the historical standards that he 
articulates.  The pedigrees of all our holdings are contaminated with the
cruelest injustice, and when wealthy individuals are being required to
support the meager lifestyle of people much less fortunate than them, it 
is quite unclear whether they are being required to do so out of
79. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, supra note 1, at 76 (“Everyone has the right to a 
standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, 
including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the
right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age 
or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.” (emphasis added)).
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resources that are morally theirs or out of ill-gotten resources that are 
“theirs” only in the shallowest of legal senses.
In general, theories of justice do not seem to be designed for the real
world.  But the socioeconomic rights that people talk about are.  They
are designed exactly to operate in a real world that does not answer to
ideal models of the philosophers.  “[T]he right of everyone to an adequate 
standard of living for himself and his family” laid down in Article 11(1)
of the ICESCR is supposed to apply in real world situations, whether or 
not those situations are properly governed by the strictures of whatever 
turns out to be the best theory of justice.80  True, accounts of 
socioeconomic rights are sometimes accused of being utopian.  (We 
considered this above in Part III.)  But assuming that what these rights 
require can be done, the position of their proponents is that it ought to be 
done without further ado, and certainly without waiting for the rest of an 
ideal theory of justice to swing cumbersomely into application. 
On the other hand, the thought that socioeconomic rights ought to 
have this immediate real-world application does not mean that they can 
be considered entirely apart from theories of justice.  Most theorists of
justice defend their emphasis on ideal theory because they think it 
illuminates and provides the best basis for approaching issues of nonideal
theory.  Rawls is typical: 
I examine the principles of justice that would regulate a well-ordered society.
Everyone is presumed to act justly and to do his part in upholding just 
institutions. . . .  Thus I consider primarily what I call strict compliance as 
opposed to partial compliance theory.  The latter studies the principles that 
govern how we are to deal with injustice. . . .  Obviously the problems of partial 
compliance theory are the pressing and urgent matters.  These are the things that
we are faced with in everyday life.  The reason for beginning with ideal theory
is that it provides, I believe, the only basis for the systematic grasp of 
these more pressing problems. . . .  At least, I shall assume that a deeper
understanding can be gained in no other way.81 
The need for a “systematic grasp” is important.  The disordered world in 
front of us is certainly the product of injustice.  But which aspects of the 
disorder that we see are to be attributed to injustice?  If the existing 
situation is unjust, then something needs to be done about it.  But what? 
And are we sure we can distinguish intuitively and without theoretical 
80. G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI) A, supra note 2, at 50. 
 81. RAWLS, supra note 4, at 7–8 (citations omitted).  But see AMARTYA SEN, THE
IDEA OF JUSTICE vii–xii (2009), for a more aggressive insistence on focusing on
perceptions of injustice in the first instance.
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consideration what would ameliorate and what would aggravate an
unjust situation?  I do not mean that we must simply sit on our hands 
until the theorists of justice laboriously get around to considering 
second-best theory.  But it is not clear how it is safe to proceed without 
someone doing some second-best theory—if only to be sure that the 
rights we propose to enforce actually do a good job of capturing what 
justice requires in this fraught and terrible situation.
In this regard, Robert Nozick’s comments about injustice in the real 
world are particularly interesting.  Nozick was never prepared to say that 
the historical-entitlement critique of equality and welfarism in Anarchy, 
State, and Utopia amounted to a defense of actually existing market 
institutions, nor would he pretend that the sort of Lockean defense of 
property he advocated could go any distance towards legitimizing
contemporary disparities of wealth in, for example, the United States.
On the contrary, he thought it undeniable that contemporary holdings 
would be condemned as unjust by any remotely plausible conception of
historical entitlement.  (The point of Nozick’s argument in chapters 7
and 8 of Anarchy, State, and Utopia was that egalitarians were
condemning the existing distribution for the wrong reason—simply as 
unequal—rather than on account of the violence, fraud, expropriation, 
ethnic cleansing, and state corruption involved in the history of most 
holdings of property in America.)  He acknowledged that once actual 
historical injustice was established, the burden would fall on the part of
his conception dealing with the rectification of injustice.  The ideal part 
of Nozick’s theory might reject welfare transfers out of hand as 
violations of property owner’s rights; it might condemn income taxes as 
amounting to illicit and coercive seizure of labor from honest workers. 
But he doubted whether these condemnations could be sustained once 
one started figuring out how to deal with the burden of actual injustice: 
These issues are very complex and are best left to a full treatment of the
principle of rectification.  In the absence of such a treatment applied to a
particular society, one cannot use the analysis and theory presented here to
condemn any particular scheme of transfer payments, unless it is clear that no
considerations of rectification of injustice could apply to justify it.82 
That itself is a remarkable and honest concession.  But if we accept it, 
we also have to accept the corollary that the schemes of transfer that
seem most obvious to us—as proponents of socioeconomic rights—may
not be exactly (or even approximately) the schemes of transfer that 
rectification requires.  It may not be easy to say what rectification
requires, but it is worth considering at the very least whether there are
 82. NOZICK, supra note 10, at 231. 
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any important pitfalls and oversimplifications that it requires us to steer
clear of. 
VIII. JUSTICE AND PUBLIC POLICY
In Rawls’s theory and in other theories of justice, there is considerable
distance between the models that the theory uses and the principles that
it generates, on the one hand, and particular policy recommendations, on 
the other.83  (This is as true of nonideal theory as of ideal theory.  There
is likely to be considerable distance between the theory of what Rawls
calls partial-compliance or the theory of what Nozick calls rectification, 
on the one hand, and particular policy recommendations, on the other.)
How is this distance to be navigated?  There are two ways of answering.
One is to consider the substantive reasoning that is involved in using
principles of justice to generate public policy recommendations.  The
other is to consider the institutional processes by which this reasoning is 
actually conducted. 
Substantively, we should try to ensure that the route taken from
abstract principles to particular policy recommendations passes through 
a consideration of the way in which the laws and institutions impacting 
people operate as a whole.  We know that what we do about health care, 
for example, may affect employment opportunities, or the quality and
fairness of the provision that is made for public education may determine
how badly the impoverishment of certain families affects the prospects 
and opportunities for children.  I think John Rawls is right to insist that 
the subject of justice is the basic structure of society taken as a whole
and considered in respect of the impact it has as a system on the life 
prospects of each individual.84  Socioeconomic rights, as commonly 
formulated, do not take this perspective.  Instead they deal, in what I
have said is a sort of line-item way, with particular areas of public
policy—with education, social security, health care, provision for the
very poor, and so on—each area with its right or set of rights.  A list of 
socioeconomic rights does not have the capacity that a theory of justice 
has to consider and evaluate the net impact that the basic structure
83. There may also be some distance between socioeconomic rights—formulated 
as human rights or constitutional rights—and social policy recommendations: an actual 
system of welfare provision, however generous, is much more than just a positivization 
of propositions like Article 25(1) of the UDHR or Article 11(1) of the ICESCR.  But the 
distance is likely to be much less in this case.
 84. RAWLS, supra note 4, at 6–10. 
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comprising all of these aspects taken together will have on the life
prospects of various individuals. 
Of course specific public policy prescriptions will focus on particular 
topics; they will not themselves be holistic.  And claims of socioeconomic
rights are like them in this regard.  So we may say that the socioeconomic 
rights represent—or are very close to—policy outputs, and that a
mistake has been made in this Article by comparing them to principles 
of justice that are not identifiable with output prescriptions in the same
way.  That is fair as far as it goes.  The trouble is that claims of right 
often present themselves not just as specific policy demands but as each
sitting on its own bottom, so to speak, with its own separate foundations.
Rights present themselves as separable in their formulation and in their
foundations.  Just as the principle of free speech is justified in a way that 
is quite separate from, say, the right not to be tortured, the idea is that 
Article 11 of the ICESCR will have its own justification, Article 12 will 
have a somewhat different justification, and so on. Each right stands on
its own and demands attention. In that regard, rights differ quite radically
from the policy prescriptions that emerge from the application of a theory
of justice like Rawls’s theory.  Superficially they may resemble 
one another.  But what the Rawlsian theory generates regarding what is 
required in the way of, say, education will emerge from a process in
which both the competition between education and other demands on 
resources and the relation between education and other arrangements’
impact on people’s life prospects have been properly considered
together.  That is unlikely to be true of the socioeconomic rights. 
Let me emphasize that I do not rule out the possibility that some
claims that are both particular and more or less absolute may emerge
from a theory of justice.  (We considered this in Part V.)  Maybe elementary 
education, for example, is so important in and of itself to children’s life 
prospects that even taking into account other impacts and other demands 
that compete for the same resources, it must emerge in its own right as
an uncompromising demand.  That is certainly a possibility and—I am 
saying—that is the way to establish that there are socioeconomic rights. 
Just consulting a list is not. 
Turning now to the institutional context, we might note that one
advantage of working through these issues in the context of a theory of 
justice is that it postpones as long as possible commitment to any 
particular political or institutional process.  Introducing the language of 
rights tends to tilt matters decisively towards judicial rather than
legislative or executive processes.  In many political systems, rights are 
entrusted as a matter of course to courts for administration or enforcement. 
It is true that sometimes legislation may be devoted to a scheme for the
implementation of people’s rights: one thinks of the Civil Rights Acts in
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the United States, for example.  In general, however, it is commonly 
thought to be the task of the courts to determine finally whether a legislative 
scheme properly respects people’s rights and whether particular legislation 
unduly encroaches on or neglects or undermines people’s rights.85 
This makes a certain amount of sense in the case of ordinary civil and 
political rights.  Though there are issues of interpretation, the rights 
themselves are generally self-contained, and any issues of conflicts between
rights are of a sufficiently modest character to be dealt with case by
case using some sort of balancing test.  In the case of socioeconomic 
rights, however, we are dealing with entitlements each of which represents 
a claim to a share of arguably scarce resources. Moreover, these
resources are made available under the auspices of the state budgets,
where various welfare claims compete with one another and with other
demands for funding, not to mention the fact that their availability in the 
first place depends on taxation, which means that, in some sense, they
compete with other personal as well as fiscal priorities that taxpayers
may have.  Socioeconomic-rights claims in court are not just interpretive, as
other rights claims are; they are also inherently budgetary—they have 
very extensive fiscal implications.  It is far from clear that a courtroom is
the right place for such claims to be resolved; many have argued that it is 
not.86  On the other hand, some judges and legal scholars have come
up with sophisticated and imaginative ways in which courts can
vindicate claims of this kind without encroaching too far into the fiscal
responsibilities of the elective branches of government.87  Even so, it 
would be a pity if courts came to be seen as the main way or the only 
way to vindicate these claims.  If we assume that it is important for them
85. Elsewhere I have criticized the practice of rights-based judicial review of
legislation, but I do not propose to take up that general issue here.  See Jeremy Waldron, 
The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346 (2006). 
86. See, e.g., Aryeh Neier, Social and Economic Rights: A Critique, 13 HUM.
RIGHTS BRIEF 1, 2 (2006) (“[W]henever you get to these broad assertions of shelter or 
housing or other economic resources, the question becomes: What shelter, employment, 
security, or level of education and health care is the person entitled to?  It is only 
possible to deal with this question through the process of negotiation and compromise. 
Not everybody can have everything.  There have to be certain decisions and choices that 
are made when one comes to the question of benefits, and a court is not the place where 
it is possible to engage in that sort of negotiation and compromise.”). 
87. The work of the South African Constitutional Court has been exemplary in this
regard.  See, e.g., Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign 2002 (10) BCLR
1033 (CC) (S. Afr.); Gov’t of the Republic of South Africa v. Grootboom 2000 (11) 
BCLR 1169 (CC) (S. Afr.); see also Mark Tushnet, Social Welfare Rights and the Forms 
of Judicial Review, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1895, 1895–97 (2004). 
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to be pursued also in a political context, then the justification for
elaborating socioeconomic claims in the context of a theory of justice is 
evident.  Theories of justice offer us principled ways of thinking about
rival demands in politics that take seriously their individualized
distributive dimension while at the same time not flinching from
the fact that they do compete with other demands. Introducing rights 
formulations at an early stage prevents this, or makes it more difficult, or
makes its success depend precariously on complex and sophisticated
structures dealing with possible conflicts of rights that, as things stand, 
many modern theories of human rights lack. 
IX. CONCLUSION
It is an unhappy feature of the language of rights that it expresses 
demanding moral claims in a sort of line-item way, presenting each
individual’s case peremptorily, as though it brooked no denial, no
balancing, and no compromise.  That feature of rights has always
troubled those who are sensitive to the fact that individuals live in a 
social environment where the things that they may reasonably expect
must be adjusted constantly to reflect similar expectations on the part of 
others.  The language of absolute and uncompromisable demands is 
simply inapt to capture anything important about our moral situation in 
such an environment.  I think this applies as well to socioeconomic
rights as to other rights claims.  It may be said that there is no difference
in this regard between theories of rights and theories of justice, for the 
latter can be uncompromising also: Fiat justitia ruat caelum.  But in fact
they are not on par.  A general theory of justice purports to take into 
account urgent claims of all kinds—including whatever claims there are 
about the wrongness or desirability of the sky’s falling.  It generates its 
conclusions on the basis of such consideration.  Theories of rights 
generally do not; their formulations may, to a certain extent, reflect
constraints of equality and universalizability, but all too often this 
dimension of argument about rights is rudimentary, and sophisticated
argument about conflicts of rights is nonexistent. 
It seems best, therefore, to postpone talking about socioeconomic 
rights until we have considered how various socioeconomic claims fare 
in a theory of justice.  I do not mean to deny that some claims of the sort 
that we find in Articles 9–13 of the ICESCR or in Articles 23–26 of the 
UDHR may turn out to be justified.  The point is that a stronger and 
more compelling case can be made for them if they are validated within 
the context of theorizing that enables other claims, other demands, and 
other moral considerations to make their best pitch against them.
Theorizing about justice offers just such a context.  So for that reason, I 
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think it is better to let socioeconomic rights emerge from a theory of
justice than to try to defend them, line by line, on their own merits. 
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